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FORFEITURE OF AIRCRAFT USED IN CRIMES-
THE CONSEQUENCES TO THE INNOCENT
OWNER OR SECURITY INTEREST
HOLDER
STEPHEN A. YOUNGMAN
F ORFEITURE OF AIRCRAFT used in crimes is proba-
bly, at most, a remote concern to the typical aircraft
owner or to one who makes a loan which is secured by an
aircraft. An aircraft, however, is subject to forfeiture for a
wide variety of criminal activities.' Forfeiture statutes may
even lead to forfeiture of an innocent owner's aircraft2 or of
an aircraft in which a person holds a security interest.3 While
such a result may seem very inequitable to the innocent
owner or security interest holder, the basis for allowing these
forfeitures is deeply rooted in the history of forfeiture law.4
This comment will trace the development and history of
forfeiture as applied to innocent owners and security interest
holders.' Recent federal court decisions will be examined,
and the present state of the law will be discussed. Addition-
ally, possible bases for avoiding forfeiture of the innocent
, Smith, How to Prevent Federal Forfeitures in Criminal Cases, 26 PRAC. LAW. 11, 12-13
(1980). See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982); 49 U.S.C. §§ 781, 782 (1976) (transportation
of controlled substances).
2 For purposes of this comment, an innocent owner is one who had no knowledge of
any illegal use of his property and who did not participate in the illegal activity. See
in/ia text accompanying note 107.
A security interest is defined by the Uniform Commercial Code as "an interest in
personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation."
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1977). See thi/a text accompanying notes 113-160 for a discussion
of forfeiture of the property of an innocent owner.
4 See in/ia text accompanying notes 6-107 for the history of forfeiture law.
See inia notes 6-107.
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owner's or security interest holder's property will be
suggested.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The rationale for allowing forfeiture of an aircraft irrespec-
tive of the culpability6 of the owner or security interest holder
has its roots in Biblical times.' In the Old Testament's Book
of Exodus it is said: "If an ox gore a man that he dies, the ox
shall be stoned, and his flesh not eaten."8 The ox is consid-
ered the offending object without regard to the conduct of its
owner. This idea of property being the offending object is
also evidenced in Greek and Roman law, where forfeiture of
the death-causing object was unrelated to the fault of the
owner.9 This concept of forfeiture without fault was enunci-
ated by Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of Eng-
land in which he stated: "It matters not whether the owner
were concerned in the killing or not; for, if a man kills an-
other with my sword, the sword is forfeited as an accursed
thing."' o
The concept of the "deodand"" developed in England as
the basis for forfeiture of property of an innocent owner. 12
' Culpability means the blameworthiness or criminal intent of a person. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 341 (5th ed. 1979).
1 The early history of forfeiture law has been well documented. See, e.g., 0. HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 7-12 (1946); Finklestein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on
Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereinty, 46 TEMP. L.Q.
169, 169-233 (1973); Smith, Modern Forfeiture Law and Policy. 4 Proposal For Reform, 29
WM. & MARY L. REv. 661,661-69 (1978); Note, Bane of,4merican Forfeiture Law-Banished
at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768, 770-92 (1977); Note, Aircraft Forfeiture - Illegal
Activities, 47 J. AIR L. & CoM. 385, 387-94 (1982); Note, Forfeiture of Property Used in
Connection with Cri'mial Acts, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 83, 83-86 (1978).
Exodus 21:28.
0. HOLMES, supra note 7, at 7-8. In the Greek law, if a man was killed by an
inanimate object, it was to be "cast beyond the borders." Id. at 8. In Roman law if
damage was done by an animal or inanimate object, it had to be surrendered or, in the
alternative, the owner had to pay for the damage. Id
I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 301 (T. Cooley ed. 1899).
A deodand is "any personal chattel which was the immediate occasion of the
death of any reasonable creature, and which was forfeited to the crown to be applied to
pious uses." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 392 (5th ed. 1979).
'2 Smith, supra note 7, at 661; Note, Aircraft Forfeitures-Illegal Activities, supra note 7,
at 388.
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Forfeited property passed to the King, purportedly for use by
the Church in saving the soul of the person killed by the ob-
ject.1 3 More likely, however, the King used such property for
charity or in order to support the deceased's family.' 4 The
concept of deodands was eliminated in England,' 5 probably
due to the increased number of accidental deaths during the
industrial revolution.' 6 While deodands were formally abol-
ished in 1846 by the Act for Compensating the Families of
Persons Killed by Accidents, 7 in a case' 8 decided the same
year, the court nevertheless continued to follow the principle
that property could be forfeited regardless of the owner's
fault. '
The historical background for forfeiture discussed above
was instrumental in the development of the law of forfeiture
in the United States as applied to innocent owners and secur-
ity interest holders. One important decision early in this de-
velopment was The Palmyra.20 That case involved a Spanish
vessel which the United States seized on the high seas pursu-
ant to a statute2 ' for piracy.22 In an action for condemna-
tion 23 of the vessel, the lower court called for the return of the
,:, W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 300.
" Smith, supra note 7, at 661; Note, Aircraft Forfeiture - Illegal Activities, supra note 7,
at 388.
,r, Smith, supra note 7, at 661; Note, Aircraft Forfetture - Illegal Activites, supra note 7,
at 388; see infra note 17 and accompanying text.
", Note, Aircraft Forfeiture - Illegal Activities, supra note 7, at 388.
,7 Id See 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. ch. 62.
11 Regina v. Woodrow, 15 M. & W. 404, 153 Eng. Rep. 907 (Exch. 1846). In that
case a tobacco dealer received adulterated tobacco products from the manufacturer.
The penalty for possession of such adulterated tobacco products was forfeiture of 200
pounds of such tobacco products. Although the defendant claimed to have no knowl-
edge of the adulteration, the court held that knowledge of the condition was not a
requirement of the statute and ordered the forfeiture. 153 Eng. Rep. at 910.
19 Note, Aircraft Forfeture - Illegal Activities, supra note 7, at 388.
- 25 U.S. 1 (12 Wheat) (1827); See Note, Aircraft Forfeiture - Illegal Activities, supra
note 7, at 389.
2' An Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States, and Punish the Crime of
Piracy, 3 Stat. 510 (1819); An Act to Continue in Force "An Act to Protect the Com-
merce of the United States," and to Make Further Provisions for Punishing the Crime
of Piracy, 3 Stat. 600 (1820).
22 25 U.S. at 2.
2:, An action for condemnation under admiralty law is an action in rem to declare a
captured vessel as a prize, or to forfeit the vessel to the government for violation of
laws. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 264 (5th ed. 1979).
992 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
ship to its owner.24 The United States Supreme Court de-
clared the action to be a proceeding in rem 25 under authority
of an act of Congress.2 6 The primary argument asserted
against forfeiture was that before a proceeding against the
vessel could have been instituted in rem, a conviction in per-
sonam27 should have been entered for the offense of piracy.28
The Court noted that at common law personal property was
forfeited to the Crown for felonies, as forfeiture was the conse-
quence of a person's conviction. 29 The Court, however, found
this common law view inapplicable to statutorily created for-
feitures in rem.3 In justifying forfeiture of the vessel, the
Court stated: "The thing is here primarily considered as the
offender, or rather the offense is attached primarily to the
thing . . . .", The Court viewed the proceeding in rem
against the ship as independent of and unaffected by any per-
sonal criminal prosecution against the offenders. 2
The Palmyra established that a forfeiture proceeding is
brought against the property, independent of any proceeding
against the property owner, and the theoretical groundwork
was thus laid for forfeiture of property regardless of the
1, 25 U.S. at 2.
2r, A proceeding in rem is an action against the property itself or to enforce rights in
that property. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877).
- 25 U.S. at 5. See supra note 21 for the Congressional acts which authorized the
action.
21 An action in personam is an action against the person. BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 711 (5th ed. 1979).
28 25 U.S. at 8. At the time of the action against the ship, the statute did not provide
for personal punishment for the offense of piracy. Id. at 9.
- Id at 9.
M Id
31 Id.
: Id. To explain the rationale of the proceeding against the ship as being independ-
ent of a personal criminal prosecution, the Court stated:
If the argument at the bar [the requirement of personal conviction] were
well founded, there could never be a judgment of condemnation pro-
nounced against any vessel coming within the prohibitions of the acts on
which the present libel is founded; for there is no act of Congress which
provides for the personal punishment of offenders who commit 'any pi-
ratical agression, search, restraint, depredation or seizure,' within the
meaning of those acts. Such a construction of the enactments, which
goes wholly to defeat their operation, and violates their plain import, is
utterly inadmissable.
COMMENTS
owner's or security interest holder's wrongdoing. The Palmyra,
however, did not completely develop forfeiture law as applied
to the innocent owner or security interest holder. The Court
in The Palmyra referred to the conviction of an offender rather
than an owner or security interest holder.33 Consequently,
the lack of a statute punishing piracy 34 provided a basis for
upholding the forfeiture in The Palmryra, while today personal
punishment is provided for activities which subject an air-
craft to forfeiture. 5
The idea that an owner's property can be subject to forfei-
ture without his having committed any wrongdoing was fur-
ther developed by the United States Supreme Court in
Dobbins Dii/lery v. United States.36 In Dobbins Distillery the
owner leased a distillery to a third party.37 While operating
and in possession of the distillery, the lessee allegedly failed to
keep required records, falsified the records kept, and refused
to deliver, in violation of the statute, these records to revenue
officers. 38 As a result of the lessee's actions, the distillery was
forfeited. 39 The distillery owner defended the forfeiture ac-
tion by claiming that he had no knowledge of the lessee's sev-
eral alleged violations.4 ° Nonetheless, the United States
Circuit Court for the District of Iowa ordered the property
forfeited and the Supreme Court affirmed that order.4
As in The Palmyra, the Court based its decision on the ra-
tionale that the action proceeded against the property itself,
rather than against the owner.4 2 The Court held that the
property was subject to forfeiture because of its contribution
xiId
:14 See supra note 28.
:11 See supra note I for some statutes that may provide for an aircraft forfeiture.
96 U.S. 395 (1878).
' Id. at 396.
Id See An Act Imposing Taxes on Distilled Spirits and Tobacco, and for Other
Purposes, 25 Stat. 125, 142-43 (1868).
96 U.S. at 395.
Id at 397.
4, Id at 404.
42 Id at 399. See supra text accompanying note 31 for the rationale of the Court in
The Palmyra holding that the offense attaches to the thing.
1984] 993
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to the illegal acts of the lessee.43 The Court found the owner's
lack of knowledge irrelevant since the owner, in leasing the
land as a distillery, was subject to any illegal use that might
be made of the property." The basis of the forfeiture, there-
fore, was that the offense attached to the distillery itself and
not to the owner's action.45
Forfeiture, as applied to the holder of a security interest,
was considered by the Supreme Court in Goldsmith-Grant Co. v.
Uni'ted States.46  Goldsmith-Grant involved the forfeiture of a
Hudson automobile used in violation of tax laws. 47  Gold-
smith-Grant Co. ("the Company") sold the automobile, but
retained title until the full amount was paid.48 The pur-
chaser used the automobile to transport untaxed liquor, and
the car was subsequently forfeited.49 The Company stated
that it had neither knowledge of, nor reason to suspect any
illegal use of the automobile. 50 Nevertheless, the property
was ordered forfeited. 5I
The Company argued that the forfeiture was "taking of
property without just compensation in violation of due pro-
cess" 52 since it, as owner, was without knowledge of and had
- 96 U.S. at 399. Refering to the role of the property in the illegal acts, the Court
stated:
[T]he forfeiture . . . is aimed against the distillery, and the real and per-
sonal property used in connection with same, including the real estate
used to facilitate the operation of distilling, and which is conducive to
that end as the means of ingress or egress, and all personal property of
the kind found there.
Id
Id4 Id
4. Id. at 401.
4,; 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
41 See An Act of Congress passed July 13, 1866, 14 Stat. 98, 151 which provides:
Whenever any goods or commodities for or in respect whereof any tax is
or shall be imposed . . . are removed, or are deposited or concealed in
any place, with intent to defraud the United States of such tax, or any
part thereof, all such goods and commodities . . . shall be forfeited, ...
and every vessel, boat, cart, carriage, or other conveyance whatsoever,
and all horses or other animals, and all things used in the removal or for
the deposit or concealment thereof, respectively, shall be forfeited.
40 Id. at 509.
4 Id.
o Id.
ri' The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that no
1984] COMMENTS
not participated in any illegal activities.53 The Company also
argued that property is regularly entrusted to others in the
course of business and for other reasons, and that Congress
could not have intended to provide for the forfeiture of an
innocent owner's property.54 Although the Court noted that
the Company's argument was convincing,55 it concluded that
the government's interest in upholding its laws outweighed
the innocent owner's interest in his property.56
The Court imposed a duty upon the property owner to
prevent illegal uses of his property, stating: "Congress inter-
poses the care and responsibility of [the owner] in aid of the
prohibitions of the law and its punitive provisions, by ascrib-
ing to the property a certain personality, a power of complic-
ity and guilt in the wrong." '57 Stating that its own approach
was not novel, the Court compared its approach to that of the
concept of deodands.58 The Court also cited Blackstone for
the premise that the owner's negligence in entrusting his
property may be a basis for its subsequent forfeiture. 9 The
Court stated that although the forfeiture provisions may be
harsh or unfair, they are "too firmly fixed in the punitive and
person "be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. See also United States v. One (1) 1972 Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat, 501
F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1974).
254 U.S. at 510.
" Id
Id In considering the argument as plausible, the Court stated: "If the case were
the first of its kind, it and its apparent paradoxes might compel a lengthy discussion to
harmonize the section with the accepted tasks of human conduct." Id
SId
57 Id Explaining the rationale of giving the property the "power of complicity and
guilt in the wrong" the Court stated:
It is the illegal use that is the material consideration, it is that which
works the forfeiture, the guilt or innocence of its owner being accidental.
If we should regard simply the adaptibility of a particular form of prop-
erty to an illegal purpose, we should have to ascribe facility to an auto-
mobile as an aid to the violation of the law. It is a "thing" that can be
used in the removal of "goods and commodities" and the law is explicit
in its condemnation of such things.
Id at 513.
" Id See supra note 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the concept of
deodands.
r! 254 U.S. at 510-11. See supra text accompanying note 10 for Blackstones's
premise.
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remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced."6
The Supreme Court in Van Oster v. Kansas6 1 further sup-
ported the notion that the history of forfeiture and govern-
mental interest may displace the innocent owner's interest.
In Van Oster, an automobile purchaser, pursuant to a sales
agreement, allowed the seller to use the automobile for busi-
ness purposes.6' An associate of the seller used the automo-
bile to transport liquor illegally and the car was subsequently
forfeited. 63 Although the automobile owner argued that the
seller illegally used the car without the owner's knowledge or
authority, the trial court ordered forfeiture of the automobile,
and the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed that order.64
The automobile owner asserted that such forfeiture would
violate due process of law because of her lack of knowledge
and involvement.65 The United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, found the owner's lack of knowledge or involvement ir-
relevant to the decision.66 The Court explained that a state
not only has authority to forfeit property used illegally by the
owner, but that it also has authority to forfeit property so
used by one in possession of such property. 67 The Court
noted that its decision not only complied with the history of
forfeiture,6" but that it was also justified by Congress' inten-
"1 254 U.S. at 511 (citing Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395). See supra
text accompanying notes 36-45. The Goldsmilh-Grant Court also relied on The Palmyra
as advancing the prevailing view of imposing forfeitures on innocent owners. See supra
notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
272 U.S. 465 (1926).
' Id at 465-66.
Id. at 466. The Kansas statute provided that any vehicle used to transport liquor
illegally could be forfeited. Id
1;4 Id
Id. See supra text accompanying note 53 for similar argument.
272 U.S. at 467.
67 Id. See also United States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. 321 (1926) (decided the
same day). In One Ford Coupe an automobile was used in the illegal transportation of
liquor. The owner of the automobile claimed to have no knowledge of the illegal use.
The Court, however, reasoned that the owner's innocence was no defense to the forfei-
ture, stating: "[I]f a forfeiture may be had [by the statute] for such use of a vehicle to
evade a tax on illicitly distilled liquor, the interests of innocent persons in the vehicle
are not saved." 272 U.S. at 325.
- 272 U.S. at 467. In upholding the decision the Court stated: "It is not unknown
or indeed uncommon for the law to visit upon the owner of property the unpleasant
consequences of the unauthorized action of one to whom he has entrusted it." Id.
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tion that forfeiture be used as a secondary measure to prevent
such illegal uses.69 The Court, therefore, concluded that an
owner relinquishing possession of his property is subject to
the peril of possible forfeiture. 70 The Court easily rejected the
owner's due process argument 7' by relying on previous
decisions. 72
The above-mentioned Supreme Court decisions established
a harsh doctrine of forfeiture with regard to the innocent
owner or security interest holder. Although such forfeiture
seemed deeply entrenched in American jurisprudence the
Court, in 1929, began to retreat from this firm position. In
United States v. One 1936 Ford V-8 Deluxe Coach73 the Court con-
sidered the sale of an automobile by a dealer to a purchaser
who was acting on behalf of his brother." The dealer as-
signed the sales contract to a credit agency which, before ac-
cepting the contract, made a thorough investigation of the
apparent purchaser. 75  Believing that the purchaser was
uninvolved in illegal activities, the credit agency purchased
- Id at 467-68. See also General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286
U.S. 49 (1932). In that case, General Motors Corporation intervened as owner of an
automobile that was used for transporting liquor illegally. Although General Motors
Corporation was an innocent party, the Court reasoned that the order of forfeiture
should be upheld because "forfeiture of vehicles bearing smuggled goods is one of the
time-honored methods adopted by the Government for the repression of the crime of
smuggling." 286 U.S. at 56.
", 272 U.S. at 467. The Court reasoned that this idea would also supply an addi-
tional measure against illegal uses and relieve the courts from determining if any form
of collusion existed between the innocent owner and the person using the property
illegally. Id at 467-68.
, See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the due process
argument.
1* 272 U.S. at 468 (citing Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505; Dob-
bin's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395). See supra notes 36-60 and accompanying
text for a discussion of these cases.
307 U.S. 219 (1939).
7, Id at 222. The automobile was sold to Guy Walker, the person who used the
vehicle illegally. The contract under which the car was sold, however, was executed in
the name of Paul Walker, brother of Guy Walker, apparently so Guy Walker's wife
would be unable to interfere with the contract. Guy Walker had a record of prior
illegal activities. Id
- Id. at 223. The credit company investigated Paul Walker before accepting the
contract by seeking references from local police authorities. No investigation was made
of Guy Walker. Id
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the contract.76 The brother and true purchaser did, in fact,
use the automobile in violation of revenue laws, and the car
was subsequently forfeited."
The United States Supreme Court, in an action for remis-
sion of the forfeiture, 78 retreated somewhat from its former
position and upheld the remission of forfeiture of the automo-
bile ordered by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.79
The Court stated that facts and surrounding circumstances
must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine if for-
feiture is necessary.8 ° Furthermore, the Court stated that an
- Id. at 224.
77 Id at 221.
m The petition for remission is an alternative measure an innocent owner may use to
prevent forfeiture of his property. See infra text accompanying notes 212-219 for a
discussion of the petition for remission.
'1 See supra text accompanying notes 20-72 for a discussion of the position of the
Supreme Court prior to One Deluxe Coach. See also Liquor Law Repeal and Enforce-
ment Act of August 27, 1935, 49 Stat. 872, 878, reliedon in One Deluxe Coach, 307 U.S. at
221. The Act provides:
Sec. 204(a) Whenever, in any proceeding in court for the forfeiture,
under the internal revenue laws, of any vehicle or aircraft seized for a
violation of the internal revenue laws relating to liquors, such forfeiture
is decreed, the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to remit or mitigate
the forfeiture.
(b) In any such proceeding the court shall not allow the claim of any
claimant for remission or mitigation unless and until he proves (1) that
he has an interest in such vehicle or aircraft, as owner or otherwise,
which he acquired in good faith, (2) that he had at no time any knowl-
edge or reason to believe that it was being or would be used in the viola-
tion of laws of the United States or of any State relating to liquor, and
(3) if it appears that the interest asserted by the claimant arises out of or
is in any way subject to any contract or agreement under which any
person having a record or reputation for violating laws of the United
States or of any State relating to liquor has a right with respect to such
vehicle or aircraft, that, before such claimant acquired his interest, or
such other person acquired his right under such contract or agreement,
which ever occurred later, the claimant, his officer or agent, was in-
formed in answer to his inquiry, at the headquarters of the sheriff, chief
of police, principal Federal internal revenue officer engaged in the en-
forcement of the liquor laws, or other principal local or Federal law-
enforcement officer of the locality in which the claimant has made any
other inquiry as to the character or financial standing of such other per-
son, that such other person had no such record or reputation.
Id.
307 U.S. at 225. In interpreting the statute allowing forfeiture, the Court stated:
[I]n our view Congress did not intend to impose upon the lienor the
obligation to ascertain at his peril the identity of every person having an
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innocent owner or security interest holder should be afforded
relief where justified.81 The Court reasoned that a truly inno-
cent party should not have his property forfeited unless such
forfeiture is within the "letter and spirit of the law."'8 2 In jus-
tifying remission of the forfeiture, the Court noted that forfei-
ture is not a favored remedy;8 3 it was originally intended to
protect revenues, not to punish without fault.84 Accordingly,
the order of the Circuit Court remitting the forfeiture was
affirmed.85
Supreme Court activity relating to an innocent owner's or
security interest holder's forfeiture of property remained un-
changed until 1971. In United States v. United States Coin &
Currency,8 6 however, the Court rejected a forfeiture. That case
involved the conviction of a defendant for failure to register
as a gambler and to pay the required gambling tax.8 7 A for-
feiture proceeding was instituted against the $8,674 which
was in the defendant's possession at the time of his arrest.88
interest in the property and to make inquiry of the law enforcement of-
ficers as to the previous record and reputation of every such person, un-
less from the documents themselves or other surrounding circumstances
the lienor possesses information which would lead a reasonably prudent
and law-abiding person to make a further investigation.
Id.
The Court apparently reasoned that the loan company was under no duty to make
further investigation since the documents it had showed the name of the person it
investigated. Compare One Deluxe Coach (surrounding circumstances must be examined
to determine if forfeiture is necessary and relief should be given where justified) with
Van Oster, 272 U.S. 465, 467 (owner of property gives possession to another at the peril
of forfeiture). See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
a' 307 U.S. at 226. The Court reasoned that in the proper case, the innocent owner
should be allowed relief from forfeiture. Id.
82 Id.
R:1 Many courts state that forfeiture is not a favored remedy but nonetheless order
forfeiture by the innocent owner. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 497 F. Supp. 459,
rev'd, 659 F.2d 97 (N.D. Iowa 1980); United States v. Modicut, 483 F. Supp. 70 (M.D.
La. 1979); United States v. One Assortment of 25 Firearms, 483 F. Supp. 16 (E.D.
Tenn. 1979); Hughes Tool Co. v. Meier, 489 F. Supp. 354 (D. Utah 1977); Kane v.
McDaniel, 407 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Ky. 1975).
- 307 U.S. at 236. The development of the law of forfeiture as applied to innocent
owners, however, was based on the premise that fault of the owner is irrelevant. This
view continues to be applied. See tnfa note 101 and accompanying text.
307 U.S. at 238.
" 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
Id. at 716.
88Id
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The trial court ordered forfeiture of the money and the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the order.8 9 The
United States Supreme Court set aside the criminal convic-
tion and forfeiture, ordering the money returnedY0
The government argued that the defendant's criminal in-
tent was irrelevant to the forfeiture action.9" The Court
found this argument unconvincing, although noting that his-
tory and prior decisions supported it.92 The Court explained
that forfeiture statutes could not be used alone but must be
considered in conjunction with other forfeiture-related stat-
utes, particularly the mitigation statutes.93 The Court stated
that forfeiture statutes, when viewed in that light, "[obvi-
ously] are intended to impose a penalty only upon those who
are sign ficantjy involved in a crimInal enterprise."'94  Thus, in
United States Coin, the Court declared that innocent owners
were free of possible forfeiture of their property used illegally
while in another's possession.95
United States Coin's requirement of "significant involve-
ment" in the illegal activity would therefore seem to protect
the airplane owner who innocently loaned his plane to an-
other. Also, the person with a security interest in such air-
craft could hardly be found to be a participant in any
criminal activity solely by virtue of holding a security inter-
est. The statutes would nevertheless continue to provide for
forfeiture of an aircraft when the owner's criminal activity
warranted such forfeiture.
The most recent Supreme Court case addressing the issue
of forfeiture as applied to an innocent owner or security inter-
est holder is Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Company.96
Calero-Toledo involved the lease of a yacht by its owner to a
- Id.
- Id. at 717.
- Id at 718-19.
12 Id. at 719 (citing Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. 505; One Deluxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219).
See supra notes 46-60 and 73-85 and accompanying text.
- 401 U.S. at 721. The statutory provision for mitigation relied on by the Court is
19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1970), discussed ina text accompanying notes 212-219.
14 401 U.S. at 721-22 (emphasis added).
Id. at 724.
' 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
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lessee who violated the law by bringing illegal drugs on board
the yacht. 97 As a result of the lessee's illegal activity, the
yacht was forfeited pursuant to a Puerto Rican statute.98 The
yacht owner's sole connection with the illegal activity was his
lease of the yacht to those who violated the law.99 The
owner, therefore, was neither involved in nor knowledgeable
of the lessee's illegal activities.'00
The Court in Calero-Toledo traced the early history of the
forfeiture action as applied to innocent property owners and
noted that innocence was not a defense to such action.' 0 1 Re-
lying on its earlier decisions, the Court reiterated the princi-
1" Id. at 665.
Id at 665-66. See P.R. LAws ANN., tit. 24 § 2512(a) (Supp. 1973) which provides:
§ 2512 Forfeitures
(a) The Following shall be subject to forfeiture to the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distrib-
uted, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this chapter;
(2) All raw materials, products, or equipment of any kind which are
used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing,
delivering, importing, or exporting of any controlled substance in viola-
tion of this chapter;
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for
property described in clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection;
(4) All conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, mount or vessels,
which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to
facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of
property described in clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection.
Id The strictness by which the Court applied the forfeiture statute in this case is re-
vealed in the fact that only one marijuana cigarette was found on board the yacht. 416
U.S. at 693 (Douglas, J. dissenting). See also United States v. One 1976 Porsche 91 IS,
670 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1979) (.226 grams of marijuana in vehicle); United States v.
One 1971 Cheverolet Corvette, 393 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (holding that no
matter how small the amount of contraband, vehicle is subject to forfeiture).
416 U.S. at 668.
' Id
... Id at 680-83. Mere innocence of the owner continues to be denied as a defense.
See, e.g., United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1980)
(claimant's lack of knowledge or involvement in the illegal activity does not preclude
forfeiture of automobile because it is the property which is "guilty and hence deserving
of confiscation"); United States v. One 1975 Ford Pickup Truck, 558 F.2d 755 (5th Cir.
1977) (holding that forfeiture is proper unless claimant can prove that possession of the
property was taken without the owner's consent); United States v. One 1972 Toyota
Mark II, 505 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that innocence is no defense to a
forfeiture action); Devito v. United States Dept. of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin.,
520 F. Supp 127 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (finding that in addition to proving innocence, the
owner must prove she did all reasonably possible to prevent an illegal use); United
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ple that the thing is guilty, not its owner. 0 2  It also
emphasized that forfeitures ordered against innocent owners
furthers the laws against criminal activity"0 3 and deters crimi-
nal conduct by discouraging such activity. 0 4 The Court dis-
tinguished United States Coin,"°5 stating: "[that case] did not
overrule prior decisions that sustained application to in-
nocents of forfeiture statutes . . .not limited in application
to persons 'significantly involved in a criminal enter-
prise.' '"06 The Court, however, stopped short of declaring
forfeiture appropriate in every case. In fact, the Court specif-
ically set forth two situations in which forfeiture by the inno-
cent owner or security interest holder would be
inappropriate:
It therefore has been implied that it would be difficult to re-
ject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property sub-
jected to forfeiture had been taken from him without his
privity or consent. Similarly, the same might be said of an
owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and
unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done
all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the pro-
scribed use of his property; for, in that circumstance, it would
be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate pur-
States v. One 1973 Pace Arrow M300 Motor Home, 379 F. Supp. 223 (C.D. Ca. 1974)
(finding that innocence of the owner is not a defense to a forfeiture proceeding).
1o 416 U.S. at 683. The Court cited: The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1 (12 Wheat) (1827)
(proceeding against the property is independent of any personal criminal prosecution
against the offender); United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210 (2 How.) (1844)
(treating the property as the offender regardless of the conduct of the owner); Dobbin's
Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878) (subjecting property to forfeiture be-
cause of its contribution to the illegal acts); Goldmsmith-Grant Co. v. United States,
254 U.S. 505 (1921) (holding that property has "power of complicity and guilt in the
wrong"); United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. 321 (1926) (holding
that where forfeiture of the property is proper, the innocent owner has no interest);
Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926) (holding that the owner's lack of knowledge
or involvement is irrelevant to a forfeiture of illegally used property); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S. 49 (1932) (holding that forfeiture of prop-
erty is a "time-honored" method to prevent illegal activity).
See supra text accompanying note 56.
,o 416 U.S. at 683-87. See supra note 57.
401 U.S. 721. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94 for the rationale used by
the Court in United States Coin.
"; 416 U.S. at 688.
poses and was not unduly oppressive."'
Because the innocent owner in Calero- Toledo relinquished pos-
session of the yacht voluntarily and made no attempt to com-
ply with the Court's second exception, the property was
ordered forfeited. 10 8
II. POST CALERO-TOLEDO
The cases following Calero- Toledo have resulted in divergent
views on forfeiture of the property of innocent owners and
security interest holders.10 9 The courts generally have had no
problem with the first exception enunciated in Calero-To-
ledo," ° which involved the taking of property without the
owner's consent. The courts in such situations hold that the
property should be returned to the owner. 1' Controversey
has arisen, however, with regard to the second exception of
Calero-Toledo. That exception involves the situation in which
the owner lacks knowledge of the illegal activities and does all
reasonably possible to prevent such activities.112 The follow-
ing examination of the post Calero-Toledo cases reveals how
the courts have interpreted the Calero-Toledo exceptions.
A. Cases Allowing Forfeiture
United States v. One 1971 Cheverolet Corvette,' 13 decided by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, involved the purchase of an automobile by a mar-
ried woman. 1 4 Although the automobile was purchased with
the purchaser's own earnings and was considered to be her
property alone," 5 title to that automobile was placed both in
,o7 Id. at 689-90.
.o fd.
'9 See infra 113-178 for the interpretations given by the lower federal courts of the
Calero- Toledo exception.
"* See supra text accompanying note 107.
See, e.g., United States v. One 1975 Ford Pickup Truck, 558 F.2d 755 (5th Cir.
1977).
,,2 See supra text accompanying note 107 for the Court's enunciation of the second
Calero- Toledo exception.
,,, 393 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
... Id at 345.
,,1, Id The relevance of the car being considered the wife's alone is that the innocent
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her and her husband's names.' 16 The husband had a history
of criminal activity and was warned several times by his wife
not to use her automobile in any illegal manner."1 7 The pur-
chaser, however, permitted the husband to use the automo-
bile often, and he had his own set of keys.'"8 The husband
eventually used the automobile while passing counterfeit
bills, and it was subsequently forfeited." 9
The purchaser claimed to have no knowledge of the fact
that her husband used or intended to use the automobile for
an illegal activity.' 20 Therefore, based on the Calero- Toledo ex-
ceptions to forfeiture, she argued that her automobile should
not be forfeited.' 2 ' The district court disagreed, stating: "It is
clear that Mrs. Fisher did not take all steps that could rea-
sonably be expected to prevent her husband from using the
vehicle for illicit purposes."'' 22 The court noted that since the
husband had a criminal history, yet was allowed to use the
automobile, the owner had not done all reasonably possible
to prevent the illegal use, so that the automobile should be
forfeited. 23 The court additionally noted that placing title of
the automobile in both spouse's names arguably was enough
to show that the husband had access to the automobile.'
24
Therefore, although the Calero-Toledo exceptions were consid-
ered by the court, it apparently gave a strict reading to the
second Calero- Toledo exception and relied more heavily on the
established history of allowing forfeiture regardless of the
owner defense could not be raised if the husband was considered as an owner. See
supra note 2 and text accompanying note 107 for the definition of an "innocent owner."
,,, 393 F. Supp. at 345.
,,, Id This claim constituted a part of the wife's argument that she had done all she
could reasonably do to prevent her property from being put to an illegal use. Id. at
348.
- Id at 345.
"9 Id at 344.
2 Id See also United States v. One 1977 Cherokee Jeep, 639 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.
1981) (ordering vehicle forfeited when husband used it illegally although wife pro-
fessed no knowledge or involvement in the illegal activitity).
12, 393 F. Supp. at 348.
,22 Id See also, United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans Vehicle, 621 F.2d 444,
448 (1st Cir. 1980) (claimant failed to show all steps were taken to prevent an illegal
use of her property).
123 393 F. Supp. at 348.
124 Id.
owner's wrongdoing. 25
The United States District Court for the Distict of Hawaii
used similar reasoning in United States v. Four (4) Pinball Ma-
chines.'26  That case involved the lease of pinball machines
subject to a special tax. 127 The pinball machines were seized
because of the lessee's failure to pay the tax.' 28 The owner of
the machines argued that it was an innocent owner and not
"significantly involved in the criminal activity.' ' 29 Neverthe-
less, the district court ordered forfeiture of the machines stat-
ing: "The courts are not unsympathetic to the truly
'innocent' owner. '"130 The court held that although the
owner of the property, was "uninvolved and unaware of" any
illegal use of the property, it failed to show that it had done
all reasonably possible to prevent such use of its property.1
31
In United States v. One 1973 Buick Riviera Automobile,1 32 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit faced a
situation in which an automobile owner's son used the auto-
mobile to transport marijuana. 33 As a result of the son's ille-
gal activity, the automobile was forfeited. 3' The owner's
defense to the forfeiture action was his lack of knowledge of
any illegal use of his automobile. 135 The district court gave
little weight to the owner's asserted defense, however, and
12r, The forfeiture of the vehicle, in spite of the owner's lack of knowledge and non-
participation in the criminal activity, coupled with a warning not to use the property
illegally, seems to indicate that the forfeiture was based on the theory that innocence is
irrelevant. See supra note 101 for similar holdings.
126 429 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Hawaii 1977).
,27 Id at 1004.
12. Id.
129 Id at 1006.
- Id at 1006-07.
1:11 Id at 1009. The case seems somewhat harsh in that the machines were forfeited
for failure of the lessee of the machines to pay a required tax while the owner of the
machines was at all times willing to pay the applicable tax to prevent forfeiture. Id at
1004.
.32 569 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1977).
'1 Id at 898. The amount of marijuana found in the vehicle was 234 pounds. Id
Compare Calero- Toledo, 401 U.S. at 665-66, in which forfeiture was ordered where only
one marijuana cigarette was found. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
- 560 F.2d at 898.
1, Id at 899.
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granted the government's motion for summary judgment.'36
On appeal to the Eight Circuit, the owner reasserted his
innocence, and the government argued that the owner's inno-
cence was irrelevant to the action. 37 The court agreed with
the government, stating that an owner's innocence is not a
defense to the forfeiture of his illegally-used property. 3 ' The
court reasoned that it was unnecessary to consider the Calero-
Toledo exception of whether the owner had done all he could
reasonably do to prevent illegal uses of his property. 39 Fur-
thermore, the court concluded that even if this exception was
considered, the defense would fail because the owner had no-
tice of the possibility of his son's illegal activities, yet permit-
ted him unrestricted use of the automobile. 40  The owner
thus could not meet the second Calero- Toldedo exception, as he
failed to do everything reasonably possible to prevent illegal
use of his property.' 4'
United States v. Six Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars
($6,700.00) in United States Currency,'42 involved money em-
bezzled from an estate in Puerto Rico and illegally brought
into the continental United States. 4 3 Representatives of the
Puerto Rican estate argued that the estate clearly was an in-
nocent party, so that the money therefrom should not be for-
Id
, Id at 900.
Id. (citing General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S. 49 (1932)
(holding that forfeiture of property is a "time-honored" method for prevention of fur-
ther criminal activity); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1 (1927) (proceeding against the prop-
erty is independent of any personal criminal prosecution against the offenders);
Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878) (holding that property has
"a power of guilt and complicity in the wrong"); United States v. Brig Malek Adhel,
43 U.S. 210 (2 How.) (1844) (treating the property as the offender regardless of the
conduct of the owner)).
,:" 560 F.2d at 901. Seesupra text accompanying note 107. In reference to the Calero-
Toledo exceptions, the court stated: "[wie need not decide whether Pearson Yacht pro-
vides a potential defense to forfeiture proceedings based on the owner's innocence,




142 615 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1980).
4 Id at 1-2.
feited.'44 The court, affirming the district court's order of
forfeiture, however, found that the estate was not an innocent
party, as it did not take all reasonably possible steps to avoid
the illegal use of its property.145 The court found that the
estate tainted its innocence by mistakenly authorizing indi-
vidual withdrawals by its co-administrators.' 46 The court
found that this mistake took the case out of the Calero-Toledo
exceptions, stating: "To be sure, there may be a subclass of
innocent persons to whom forfeiture provisions constitution-
ally cannot be applied, but the estate's answer failed to allege
sufficient facts to bring the estate within that subclass.'
'14 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
in United States v. One 1951 Douglas DC-6 Azrcrafl, 4 considered
a case involving the interest of the security interest holder in
an aircraft where forfeiture was ordered by the district court.
As part of the security agreement between the security inter-
est holder and the owner, a clause prohibiting any illegal use
of the aircraft was inserted in the agreement. 49 The owner
nevertheless used the aircraft for such activities without the
security interest holder's knowledge.150 Although the security
interest holder claimed to be innocent of any illegality, the
court held that the security interest holder "failed to prove
that he exercised due diligence in preventing the use of his
collateral" in an illegal activity.' 5' In so deciding, the court
relied on the trial court's finding that the holder failed to
"take effective and affirmative steps to see that a properly li-
censed pilot operate it; that it was not involved in illegal nar-
" Id at 2.
" Id. at 3.
Id. The estate deposited its liquid assets in an account but through error did not
require the signatures of both administrators to make withdrawals. One of the co-
administrators wrote a check on the account without the signature of the other admin-
istrator and went to South America with the money. The court determined that the
money brought into the United States had to be from the estate account since there
was apparently no other way the absconding administrator could otherwise obtain that
amount of money. Id at 2.
- Id. at 3.
10, 667 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1981).
,41 United States v. One Douglas DC-6 Aircraft, 525 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Tenn. 1979).
Id at 15.
667 F.2d at 503.
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cotic traffic; and that it was properly registered with United
States authorities, including his security claim as
collateral."' 
52
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
rejected a similar defense in United States v. One 1957 Rockwell
Aero Commander 680 Aircraf.153 The innocent owner in that
case received the airplane in payment of a debt.' 54 The air-
craft was flown in violation of customs laws and was subse-
quently seized and ordered forfeited by the district court.'55
The seizure, however, took place six months after the owner
had acquired title, and the owner was totally unaware of any
use of his aircraft during that time. 156
The owner's defense was that he was without knowledge of
the illegal use of the aircraft, 57 but, the Tenth Circuit held
this defense was insufficient. 58 The court stated that "the
owner's apparent complete inattentiveness to the aircraft for
a period in excess of six months may certainly be deemed
negligence in light of the Calero-Toledo standard."' 59 In reach-
ing its decision, the court noted that the forfeiture was harsh
but reasoned that the governmental interest in preventing
crimes outweighed this harshness. 60
B. Cases in Which Forfeiture Was Not Ordered
The decisions of the lower Federal courts discussed above
seem somewhat harsh when applied to the interest of the in-
nocent owner or security interest holder. On similar fact situ-
ations, other courts have reached the opposite and seemingly
fairer result. In United States v. One 1974 Cougar XR-7,16' a ve-
hicle was seized while in the possession of the owner's live-in
152 525 F. Supp. at 16.
,5:, 671 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1982).
154 Id. at 415-16.
,.1, Id When coming back into the United States from Mexico, the plane failed to
give the required advance notice and did not land at a customs airport. Id
-; Id at 415-16.
r, Id at 416.
,5 Id. at 418.
d9 
' Id at 417. See supra note 60 and accompanying text for similar reasoning.
6 397 F. Supp. 1325 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
boyfriend'62 who used it to transport heroin.163 The Califor-
nia district court stated that although the owner was well ac-
quainted with the person using the vehicle illegally, there was
no evidence that the owner had any knowledge of this partic-
ular illegal activity.' 6' The court reasoned that the excep-
tions of Calero-Toledo applied and thereby prevented
forfeiture, holding that the innocent owner had done all that
she could reasonably do to prevent the illegal use of her
property. 165
In United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Blazer Vehicle,166 a for-
feiture was ordered by the trial court in a situation involving
the illegal use of the vehicle by the owner's father. 67  Al-
though the father drove the vehicle with his son's permission,
the son asserted that he neither consented to the illegal use of
the vehicle nor had knowledge of such use. 168 The trial court
granted the government's motion for summary judgment and
ordered forfeiture, noting that, although forfeiture is a harsh
rule, an owner is required "to know more about his buyer, to
know more about his lessee, to know more about the person
to whom he loaned the car .... -169 The Ninth Circuit re-
versed the order granting summary judgment, however, and
held that the owner should have the opportunity to present
the defense on remand. 170
Forfeiture was denied by the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania in United States v. One
"' Id at 1326.
Id
.. Id. at 1328.
Id The circumstances to which the court refers are basically similar to cases
where forfeiture was ordered. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 114-124. The
court in One 1971 Cougar appears to be applying a more favorable reading of the Calero-
Toledo standards to the innocent owner.




17(, Id at 1391. For similar holdings, see United States v. One Tintoretto Painting
Entitled "The Holy Family With Saint Catherine and Honored Donor," 691 F.2d 603
(2d Cir. 1982); Devito v. United States Dept. of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin.,
520 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
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1976 Lincoln Mark IV"' 7 In that case, an owner loaned his
automobile to his brother-in-law who subsequently used it to
transport heroin from Detroit to Pittsburgh.' 72 There was no
evidence that the owner was involved in any of the illegal
activities or that he had any knowledge of any possible illegal
use of his automobile. 113 Although the court stated that inno-
cence provided no defense to a forfeiture proceeding, 7 4 it did
note that the Calero- Toledo exception would prevent forfeiture
if the owner had done all reasonably possible to prevent the
illegal use of his property.175
The court explained that this exception was not easily met,
as it called for an affirmative duty to protect the property
from illegal uses.' 7 6 In attempting to delineate the nature of
this affirmative duty, the court stated that "what one 'reason-
ably could be expected [to do]' to prevent criminal use of
property is a standard that must be tailored to individual cir-
cumstances." '177 Under the circumstances of this case, the
court reasoned that forfeiture should not be allowed because
the owner "did all that could be reasonably expected of him
to prevent illegal use of the vehicle" and to order forfeiture of
the vehicle "would be only to deprive an innocent party of
his car."' 78
III. OTHER DEFENSES TO THE FORFEITURE ACTION
Even if an innocent owner or security interest holder can-
not prove that he did everything reasonably possible to pre-
vent illegal use of his property, other defenses exist which
may entitle him to keep his property. These defenses may be
used in addition to the Calero-Toledo exception explained
above. These defenses will be discussed under headings as
,7. 462 F. Supp. 1383 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
,72 Id at 1386.
17. Id.
,14 Id. at 1387. See supra note 101 for similar holdings.
,7 462 F. Supp. at 1387.
,16 Id at 1391. Contrasting this duty with the innocence of an owner the court
stated that "[it connotes an affirmative duty, whereas innocence of crime and igno-




follows: lack of probable cause, illegal search and seizure, the
scope of the forfeiture statutes, prompt adjudication and the
petition for remission or mitigation.
A. Lack of Probable Cause
The showing of probable cause is often essential to the
government's action for forfeiture, as most statutes make such
a showing a prerequisite to forfeiture.179 Thus, if the inno-
cent owner or security interest holder can prove a lack of
probable cause, he may be able to destroy the government's
case. Once the government establishes a showing of probable
cause, however, the burden of proof shifts to the owner or
security interest holder to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the property is not subject to forfeiture.' °
Generally, courts evaluate probable cause in a forfeiture
action under the same standard as that in other search and
seizure cases."8 By this standard, the cause must be "reason-
able under the circumstances."' 82 Probable cause may also
be defined as a "reasonable ground for belief that the prop-
erty is being used illegally requiring less than prima facie
proof but more than a mere suspicion.' 3 Once the govern-
ment establishes probable cause, it may seize property with-
179 Smith, supra note 7, at 667.
- Id See United States v. Fourteen (14) Handguns, 524 F. Supp. 395 (S.D. Tex.
1981) (finding that once the government shows probable cause, the burden of proof
shifts to the claimant); United States v. One 1977 Cheverolet Pickup, 503 F. Supp.
1027 (D. Colo. 1980) (finding that the government has the burden of proving probable
cause and the claimant has the burden of showing that the forfeiture action is outside
the statute); United States v. Twenty-Six Firearms, 485 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(finding that where the government has proven probable cause, the burden of proof
shifts to the claimants); United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462 F. Supp.
1383 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (finding that once the government shows probable cause, forfei-
ture is automatic unless claimant can prove the forfeiture is not within the statute);
United States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 436 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D. Ga. 1977)
(finding that probable cause must first be shown, then the burden shifts to the claimant
to show why the property is not subject to forfeiture).
"' Smith, supra note 7, at 677. See United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590
F.2d 196 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. One 1973 Pontiac Grand Am, 413 F. Supp.
162, 165 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
,82 Smith, supra note 7, at 677.
-, Id. See United States v. One 1979 Mercury Cougar XR-7, 666 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1982); United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196 (6th Cir. 1978).
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out a warrant.'84 Courts rationalize such warrantless seizure
by finding that the property belongs to the government at the
moment of its illegal use.8 5 Furthermore, since forfeiture is a
proceeding in rem, 8 6 the property has no rights under the
fourth amendment.
87
B. Illegal Search and Seizure
Analogous to the defense of no probable cause is the de-
fense of illegal search and seizure of relevant evidence. 188 The
innocent owner may be unable to assert this defense in all
jurisdictions, however,' 89 as some courts believe that the rea-
son for protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
is an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy. 9 ° The
fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures can only be raised by the person whose rights
were violated, not by one who will also be incidentally ag-
grieved by the illegally obtained evidence.19' Thus, some
courts have held that because the forfeited property was in
another's possession, the owner has given up his right of
privacy. "'
C. The Scope of the Forfeiture Statutes
The innocent owner or security interest holder may be able
to prevent forfeiture by showing that the illegal use of the
'8 Comment, An Analysts of Federal Drug-Related Civil Forfeiture, 34 ME. L. REv. 435,
450 (1982).
,a, Id. The rationale is that at the time of a violation of a forfeiture statute, the
property is forfeited. A trial is held only to perfect title in the government. Id.
' See supra note 25 for the definition of a proceeding in rem.
, Comment, supra note 184, at 450.
,'s See Comment, supra note 184, at 449-50. See also Smith, supra note 7, at 679-82;
Note, Constitutional Law - Fourth Amendment - Illegal Seizure of Derivative Contraband Bars
Forfeiture, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 724 (1982).
- Smith, supra note 7, at 679. See Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530 (1926);
United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. 321 (1926).
- See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043 (1981).
,' Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969); United States v. One
1977 Mercedes Benz, 450SEL, 708 F.2d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 1983).
,92 See United States v. DalI, 608 F.2d 910 (ist Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918
(1980); United States v. Dyar, 574 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir.), cert. denid439 U.S. 982 (1978).
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property was not within the scope of the forfeiture statute."'9
The defense hinges on the statute's construction as applied to
the role of the property in the crime.194 The use of this de-
fense is illustrated by United States v. One Dodge Coupe'95 and
Platt v. United States,196 which provide the general tests.' 97 In
One Dodge Coupe the vehicle's only connection to the crime
was that it transported the offender to the scene of the illegal
activity.'98 The vehicle was nevertheless subject to forfei-
ture. "'99 The court reasoned that the vehicle was used to facil-
itate the illegal activity because it "[brought the owner] part
of the distance over which the contraband would otherwise
have to travel in order to reach him, it made the task less
difficult and lessened the labor thereof."2"
The Platt test, more favorable from the owner's point of
view, requires more than merely making the "task less diffi-
cult" or "lessening the labor thereof."'20 ' In Platt the owner of
the vehicle loaned it to her daughter. °2 The daughter drove
to a drugstore where she purchased morphine with a false
prescription. °3 The Tenth Circuit defined "facilitate" as
used in the statutes with its "ordinary and accepted mean-
ing. ' '20 Under this definition, the court held that a vehicle
was subject to forfeiture if "it is used to assist in the commis-
sion of the crime. '20 5 The court concluded that the vehicle
was not subject to forfeiture in this case, stating: "The means
employed by [the daughter] in going to the store had nothing
to do with the purchase. The ease or difficulty of the
purchase would have been the same no matter how she got
' See Smith, supra note 7, at 683-86.
I4 d.
43 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
173 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1947).
,,' Smith, supra note 7, at 683-84.
'" 43 F. Supp. at 60.
-9 Id at 62.
2- Id
- Smith, supra note 7, at 684; 163 F.2d at 167.





1014 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [49
there. '20 6 Thus, this test requires that the vehicle have a
more active role in the illegal activity.20 7
D. Prompt Adjudication
The government's failure to promptly bring a forfeiture ac-
tion after seizure of the property may also prevent a forfei-
ture.20 8 The basis of this defense is that a claimant has a
constitutional right to prompt adjudication of his property
interests. 2 " No general rule exists defining unreasonable
time, and courts apply varying standards, depending on the
circumstances of each case. 2 '0 The courts generally look to
the consequences of delay in considering whether forfeiture is
unreasonable under the circumstances.21
E. The Petition for Remission or Mtigation
If the innocent owner or security interest holder does not
wish to risk losing his property in a judicial proceeding, he
may file a petition for remission or mitigation of the forfei-
ture.212 If the remission or mitigation approach is chosen,
however, no other challenges are allowed thereafter, as filing
the petition presumes the validity of the forfeiture.21 3  The
Z. Id
-7 Smith, supra note 7, at 684.
-'s Id at 694-706. See also Comment, supra note 184, at 454. See generally Kandaras,
Federal Property Forfeiure Statutes." The Need to Guarantee a Prompt Trial, 33 U. FLA. L. REV.
195 (1981); Kandaras, Due Process and Federal Property Forfeiture Statutes.. The Need for Im-
mediate Post-Seizure Hearing, 34 Sw. L.J. 925 (1980).
Smith, supra note 7, at 694 (stating that due process prohibits long delays); Com-
ment, supra note 184, at 454 (discussing deprivation of due process).
2,o See, e.g., Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that delay
attributed to claimant does not jeopardize government's case); United States v. One
1970 Ford Pickup Truck, 564 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding delay of eleven months
as unreasonable); United States v. $62,972 in United States Currency, 539 F. Supp.
586 (D. Nev. 1982) (finding that delay must be reasonable); United States v. One (1)
Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 436 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D. Ga. 1977) (finding that an eight and
one-half month delay in instituting forfeiture proceeding dictated return of aircraft).
2,, Comment, supra note 184, at 454. See also United States v. $62,972 in United
States Currency, 539 F. Supp. 386 (D. Nev. 1982) (finding that delay was not war-
ranted even where property was not a wasting asset).
2,2 Smith, supra note 1, at 17-19. See also Smith, supra note 7, at 671-76.
213 Smith, supra note 1, at 17-19. See 28 C.F.R. § 9.5(h) (1982) which provides: "The
Determining Official shall not consider whether the evidence is sufficient to support
the forfeiture since the filing of a petition presumes a valid forfeiture."
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petition for remission or mitigation is, therefore, a last resort
and should be used only in the absence of other defenses.214
The petition for remission or mitigation is considered a
"matter of executive grace" and is unreviewable by the
courts.2 ' The requirements for a remission or mitigation re-
semble those under the Calero-Toledo defense,216 as the claim-
ant must prove the forfeiture was not due to any negligence
or intent to violate the law on his part.21 7 If a complete re-
mission of the forfeiture is not obtained, some relief may nev-
ertheless be available in the form of a mitigation of the
forfeiture.21 8 Such mitigation is applicable where, although
" Smith, supra note 1, at 19.
' Id. See Smith, supra note 7, at 672; see also United States v. One 1976 Porsche
91 IS, 670 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that Attorney General may in his discre-
tion return property); Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding
that remission is a matter of legislative grace not reviewable by the courts); Devito v.
United States Dep't of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin., 520 F. Supp 127 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (finding that a court cannot review the discretion of the Attorney General who
denied a petition for remission); United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462 F.
Supp. 1383 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (finding no right to a remission of forfeiture because it is a
matter of grace); Walker v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. Ga. 1977) (finding
that denial of a petition of remission is not reviewable by the courts).
216 See supra text accompanying note 107 for the Calero-Toledo exceptions to
forfeiture.
217 Smith, supra note 1, at 19. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1970) which provides:
Whenever any person interested in any vessel, vehicle, merchandise, or
baggage seized under the provisions of this chapter, or who has incurred,
or is alleged to have incurred, any fine or penalty thereunder, files with
the Secretary of the Treasury under the customs laws or under the navi-
gation laws, before the sale of such vessel, vehicle, merchandise, or bag-
gage a petition for the remission or mitigation of such fine, penalty or
forfeiture, the Secretary of the Treasury, if he finds that such fine, pen-
alty, or forfeiture was incurred without willful negligence or without any
intention on the part of the petitioner to defraud the revenue or to vio-
late the law, or finds the existence of such mitigating circumstances as to
justify the remission or mitigation of such fine, penalty, or forfeiture,
may remit or mitigate the same upon such terms and conditions as he
deems reasonable and just, or order discontinuance of any prosecution
relating thereto.
19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1970).
21, See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 9.6 (1982). That regulation provides:
Section 9.6 Provisions applicable to particular situations.
(a) Mitigation: In addition to his discretionary authority to grant relief
by way of complete remission of forfeiture, the determining official may,
in the exercise of his discretion, mitigate forfeitures of seized property.
This authority may be exercised in those cases where the petitioner has
not met the minimum conditions precedent of remission but where there
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the conditions of remission are not met, extreme hardship
would result from forfeiture.219
IV. SUMMARY
The decisions of the Supreme Court established a harsh
doctrine of forfeiture towards the innocent owner. The basis
for forfeiture started with The Palmyra's220 consideration of
the thing as the offender, without regard to the owner's
wrongdoing. 22' Dobbin's Distillery222 adopted The Palmyra's
harsh theory and added the additional theory that an owner
leases his property subject to the consequences of its illegal
use.223 Additional justification for forfeiture of an innocent
owner's property was enunciated in Goldsmith-Grant.224 In
that case, the Court held that governmental interest in en-
forcing laws outweighed the consequences of forfeiture to the
innocent owner or security interest holder.225 The Supreme
Court drew both from the history of forfeiture and previous
decisions to uphold forfeiture in the case of Van Oster.226 Al-
though the Supreme Court seemed to retreat from this harsh
stance for a brief period,227 it reaffirmed its harsh position in
Calero- Toledo.228 Calero- Toldeo introduced the test requiring
the owner or security interest holder to have taken all reason-
are present other extenuating circumstances indicating that some relief
should be granted to avoid extreme hardship. Mitigation may also be
granted where the minimum standards for remission have been satisfied
but the overall circumstances are such that, in the opinion of the deter-
mining official, complete relief is not warranted. Mitigation shall take
the form of a money penalty imposed upon the petitioner in addition to
any other sums chargeable as a condition to remission. This penalty is
considered as an item of cost payable by the petitioner.
Id
219 Smith, supra note 7, at 672. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 9.6 (1982).
2- 25 U.S. 1 (1827).
2, See srupra note 32 and accompanying text.
222 See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
2": See supra text accompanying note 44.
224 See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
22 See supra text accompanying note 56.
221 See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
27 See supra notes 73-94 and accompanying text.
.28 See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
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ably possible steps to prevent the illegal use of his property.229
The lower federal courts are divided as to whether the in-
nocent owner's or security interest holder's property is subject
to forfeiture. The common element seen in the cases is a de-
termination of whether the owner or security interest holder
was able to fit within the above-mentioned exception of
Calero- Toledo.23° Some actions do exist to protect the innocent
owner or security interest holder's interest.231
The key question is whether the owner did all he could
reasonably do to prevent the illegal use of his property. The
cases are in agreement, however, that innocence is not
enough,232 thereby requiring an affirmative duty to protect
the property from an illegal use.233 The owner must affirma-
tively try to prevent his property from being used by one
known to have engaged in illegal activities. 34 Where there is
no knowledge of past illegal activities, the owner still may
need to investigate the person to whom he intends to give
possession of the property. 35 Furthermore, the owner must
not negligently, or through inattentiveness, fail to protect his
property from illegal use. 2 36
V. CONCLUSION
In owning aircraft, and in dealings involving them, there is
2 See supra text accompanying note 107 for the Calero-Toledo standard.
2:1 The cases discussed in this comment which were held to be without the Calero-
Toledo exceptions are: United States v. One 1957 Rockwell Aero Commander 680 Air-
craft, 671 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. One 1951 Douglas DC-6 Aircraft,
667 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Six Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars
($6,700.00) in United States Currency, 615 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. One
1973 Buick Riviera Automobile, 560 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Four
(4) Pinball Machines, 429 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Hawaii 1977); United States v. One 1971
Chevrolet Corvette, 393 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Cases discussed where forfeiture
was not ordered are: United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Blazer Vehicle, 563 F.2d
1386 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462 F. Supp. 1383
(w.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. One 1974 Cougar XR-7, 397 F. Supp. 1325 (C.D.
Cal. 1975).
2:,, See supra notes 179-219 and accompanying text.
2:12 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
,"' See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
211 See supra text accompanying notes 117-119 and 164.
2-3 See supra text accompanying note 169.
T. See supra text accompanying note 159.
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a reasonable chance that the owner or security interest holder
will be seeking advice from an attorney. The attorney should
advise such clients of the possibility that the aircraft could be
forfeited if used illegally even though the innocent owner or
security interest holder can claim complete innocence. 37 The
client should be told why the property may be forfeited and a
forfeiture prevention plan explained to the client. 23 8 The cli-
ent should be advised to not place his property in the posses-
sion of someone who he knows has a record of past criminal
activity and, considering the value of an aircraft, should
make an investigation of the potential users of the aircraft.239
Care should be taken that the property is not neglected for
any appreciable time and deals involving the aircraft should
be carefully thought out in advance. Other factors should
also be considered depending on the circumstances of the
particular owner or security agreement. Some type of affirm-
ative action that shows the owner's concern with preventing
the illegal use of his property may tend to sway an otherwise
hostile court.
237 Smith, supra note 1, at 14.
M Id.
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